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TALKING DRUGS: THE BURDENS OF PROOF IN POSTGARCETTI SPEECH RETALIATION CLAIMS
Thomas E. Hudson
Abstract: Law Enforcement agencies fire their employees for speaking out in favor of
drug legalization, which leads the employees to sue their former employers for violating their
First Amendment Free Speech rights. These employee claims fall under the U.S. Supreme
Court’s complex speech retaliation test, most recently articulated in Garcetti v. Ceballos. The
analysis reveals that circuit courts are inconsistent as to who bears the burden of proving that
they prevail under “Pickering balancing,” and how they should construct that burden. This
Comment argues that U.S. Supreme Court precedent demands that the employer bears the
“Pickering balancing” burden, and that the Court should require employers to meet their
burden with clear and convincing evidence. Further, when applying the speech retaliation test
to law enforcement employees criticizing the war on drugs, the Court should rule that it
constitutes speech as a “citizen on a matter of public concern,” and should abandon the quasimilitary rule when engaging in “Pickering balancing.”

INTRODUCTION
“[L]egalization of drugs would end the drug war and related violence
in Mexico.”1 Following his statement, Bryan Gonzalez’s employer—the
United States Custom and Border Patrol—fired him for the content of
his speech.2 Gonzalez’s case is not unique—state and federal employers
alike have fired employees for verbally opposing the drug war.3
Similarly, public employers have fired employees for associating with
Law Enforcement Against Prohibition (LEAP), an organization that
supports legalizing marijuana and ending the drug war.4
These new cases highlight a doctrine that the U.S. Supreme Court
created in Pickering v. Board of Education.5 That doctrine grants public
employees the right to sue government employers for termination in
violation of the First Amendment if their termination is based on speech
1. Complaint at 3, Gonzalez v. Manjarrez, Jr., No. CV 11-29 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2011)
[hereinafter Gonzalez Complaint] (quote summarizing a report of what Gonzalez said).
2. Id. at 4.
3. Marc Lacey, Police Officers Find That Dissent on Drug Laws May Come With a Price, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2011, at A11; see generally Miller v. Mohave Cnty., No. CV-11-8182-PCT-FJM,
2012 WL 1078828 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2012).
4. Lacey, supra note 3, at A11; see, e.g., Gonzalez Complaint, supra note 1, at 3–4 (summarizing
a report of what Gonzalez said).
5. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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made as “a citizen on a matter of public concern.”6 Over time, the Court
has complicated the speech retaliation test developed in Pickering
(speech retaliation test) by splitting it into three prongs of ever
increasing detail.7 The Court’s creation and modification of these three
prongs have greatly narrowed the situations in which employees can
prevail on a speech retaliation suit.8
A court engages in a three-prong test when assessing an employee’s
speech retaliation claim for comments about the war on drugs. The
employee must prevail on each of the three separate prongs to win a
speech retaliation suit. The first prong requires a court to ascertain
whether or not the speech is made as a citizen on a matter of public
concern.9 If the employee proves that he or she prevails on this first
prong, a court will subject the claim to the second prong, which the
Court refers10 to as “Pickering balancing.”11 This balancing analysis
requires a court to determine whether the employee’s interest in
speaking outweighs the employer’s interest in efficiently running a law
enforcement agency.12 Finally, where a court finds that the employee
prevails on both the first and second prongs, a court will engage in a
third prong, requiring it to determine whether the speech actually caused
the employee’s termination.13
While the first and third prongs of the speech retaliation test have
clearly established burdens of proof, the second prong—Pickering
balancing—does not. The courts have failed to reach a consensus
regarding which party has the burden of proof. In fact, the courts have
failed even to define the burden.
Pickering balancing’s lack of clarity in regards to its burden leads to
unpredictable and overabundant litigation because the employers’ and
employees’ rights are not clearly delineated. The lack of clarity will lead
6. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). Note that the source of the procedural authority
to sue, like with most other Constitutional lawsuits, is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sheldon H. Nahmod,
Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42
U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 590–91 (2008).
7. Beth Anne Roesler, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Judicially Muzzling the Voices of Public Sector
Employees, 53 S.D. L. REV. 397, 416 (2008).
8. See id. at 398–99, 416, 419 (stating that the Court has greatly narrowed the speech retaliation
test).
9. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
10. Id.
11. Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs, v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 678 (1996).
12. See Stanley v. City of Dalton, 219 F.3d 1280, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000) (applying “Pickering
balancing” in a police officer employment context).
13. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
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to costly litigation, as courts struggle to conduct an unclear balance of
the employer and employee interests. Clarifying the balancing’s burden
of proof will not only streamline litigation, but will also help prevent
employees from being fired for offensive speech by more effectively
informing employers and employees as to their rights and
responsibilities. Part I of this Comment will discuss the prevalence of
law enforcement employers firing their employees for speaking out
against drug laws. Part II will outline the modern speech retaliation test
and its three main prongs, including each prong’s unique burden of
proof. Part III will argue that the Court should place a burden of clear
and convincing evidence on the employer whenever the Court conducts
Pickering balancing. Part IV will apply the speech retaliation test to
instances where law enforcement employees criticize the war on drugs,
and will argue that the Court should apply the speech retaliation test in a
manner that favors employee speech.
I.

STATE AND FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
HAVE RECENTLY FIRED THEIR EMPLOYEES FOR
OPPOSING THE DRUG WAR

Law enforcement agencies have recently fired their employees for
verbally opposing the war on drugs.14 Employers have fired employees
for such speech both inside and outside of the workplace.15 Consider
Bryan Gonzalez, a New Mexico Border Patrol agent,16 who made a
number of controversial assertions while talking with a coworker during
his shift break.17 These included a statement that the “legalization of
drugs would end the drug war and related violence in Mexico,”18 and
mention of the website LEAP.19
Gonzalez’s coworker reported these comments.20 After an internal
investigation, Gonzalez’s superior fired him, stating that Gonzalez had
“personal views that were contrary to the core characteristics of Border
Patrol Agents, which are patriotism, dedication, and esprit de corps.”21
14. See generally Lacey, supra note 3; Gonzalez Complaint, supra note 1, at 3–4; Miller v.
Mohave Cnty., No. CV-11-8182-PCT-FJM, 2012 WL 1078828, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2012).
15. See generally Lacey, supra note 3.
16. Gonzalez Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. LEAP is an organization of law enforcement members who support drug
decriminalization. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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Gonzalez had no administrative remedy because he was a probationary
employee when he was fired.22 Gonzalez subsequently brought a
lawsuit23 for speech retaliation in violation of the First Amendment’s
guarantee of free speech.24
Gonzalez’s case is one of a number of recent cases. Joe Miller, a local
probation officer in Mohave County, Arizona, is currently suing for
speech retaliation.25 His employer fired him for signing a letter—in his
personal capacity—from LEAP. The letter supported Proposition 19,
which proposed to legalize the recreational use of marijuana in
California.26 The government argued that because Miller’s signature
included his job title, the public could misinterpret Miller’s personal
support to constitute the parole agency’s endorsement of the initiative.
Miller countered that because the letter had a disclaimer at the bottom
stating that “[a]ll agency affiliations are listed for identification purposes
only[,]”27 it was sufficiently clear that he was speaking as a private
citizen, rather than on behalf of his law enforcement employer.
Another speech retaliation case occurred a few years before Gonzalez
and Miller began their suits. Mountlake Terrace Police sergeant Jonathan
Wender settled his wrongful termination suit for $815,000.28 One of his
key legal arguments29 was that the government violated the First
Amendment by retaliating against him for speaking out against the drug
war (both internally and in the press).30 Because this argument was part
of his successful claim, pro-marijuana legalization groups have taken
this case as a victory for their cause.31 This comment will next discuss
the multi-pronged speech retaliation test that governs the cases discussed
above.

22. Id. Gonzalez was a new hire, and his employment was subjected to a standard “probationary”
status for his first two years. Id. at 2. He was fired before those two years ran out. Id.
23. When this Comment went to publication, the case was still ongoing.
24. Gonzalez Complaint, supra note 1, at 5.
25. Lacey, supra note 3, at A11; Miller v. Mohave Cnty., No. CV-11-8182-PCT-FJM, 2012 WL
1078828, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2012).
26. Lacey, supra note 3, at A11; Miller, 2012 WL 1078828, at *1. The voters failed to pass
Proposition 19. John Hoeffel & Maria L. La Ganga, Youth Vote Falters; Prop. 19 Falls Short, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at A17.
27. Lacey, supra note 3, at A11.
28. Id. at A15.
29. Many issues crossing many areas of law complicate this case. See generally First Amended
Complaint, Wender v. Snohomish Cnty., No. CV 07-0197 Z (W.D. Wash. Oct. 25, 2007)
[hereinafter Wender Complaint].
30. Id. at 9–10, 13.
31. See Lacey, supra note 3, at A15.
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THE COURT MUST ENGAGE IN A MULTI-PRONGED TEST
WHEN ANALYZING A SPEECH RETALIATION CLAIM

Although government employees can challenge a termination as
unconstitutional speech retaliation,32 not all employee speech is
protected,33 and not all protected speech can sustain a claim for
retaliatory dismissal.34 The modern speech retaliation claim requires a
court to analyze three separate prongs, each with a unique burden of
proof. Recently, Garcetti v. Ceballos35 blurred the lines between the
prongs, further complicating the three-prong test.
A.

A Modern Speech Retaliation Claim Requires Courts to Conduct a
Three-Prong Test, with Each Element Having Its Own Burden of
Proof

Over time, the Court has developed a jurisprudence governing the
free speech rights of public employees.36 The Court’s primary purpose in
early cases was to establish that a speech retaliation claim actually
existed.37 As a result, the older speech retaliation cases did not employ a
multi-prong test.38 However, the Court’s legal framework to address a
32. See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (providing an example of a speech
retaliation claim). The Court decided to apply this speech retaliation doctrine to a plaintiff private
school in Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Academy, 551 U.S. 291, 299–
300 (2007). The school sued the local sports association (which it voluntarily contracted with) for
speech retaliation, because the association punished the school for violating its recruiting rules. Id.
at 294–95. While in this case the Court ruled against the plaintiff school, id. at 304, the Court’s
application of Pickering suggests that in the future the Court could protect not only individual
government employees, but also private organizations and corporations from speech retaliation by
the public agencies they contract with, id. at 299–300. See also id. at 306 (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment) (criticizing the Court’s extension of speech retaliation doctrine to a public body,
rather than an employee). The possibility that the Court will extend this doctrine to private entities is
particularly likely given the Court’s desire to give the same First Amendment protections to
corporations and organizations that it provides individuals. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, __ U.S. __,130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (ruling that “the Government may not
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity[,]” hence “[n]o sufficient
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations”).
33. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (establishing that speech is not protected if
and when its value is limited to the employment context).
34. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996) (“[E]ven termination because of
protected speech may be justified when legitimate countervailing government interests are
sufficiently strong.”) (emphasis added).
35. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
36. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (discussing “Pickering and the cases decided in its wake”).
37. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
38. See, e.g., id. (showing how the speech retaliation test was discussed in broad amorphous
terms at this time); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977).
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speech retaliation claim evolved over time.39
During this evolution, the Court broke the speech retaliation test
down into a multi-faceted inquiry.40 Today, the speech retaliation test’s
three prongs are (1) whether the employee speaks as a citizen on a
matter of public concern,41 (2) whether the employee’s interest in
speaking outweighs the employer’s interest “in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs,”42 and (3) whether the proposed
speech caused the employee’s termination.43
1.

Employees Bear the Burden of Proving that They Made Their
Speech as a Citizen on a Matter of Public Concern

The first prong requires that the employee speaks as a citizen on a
matter of public concern.44 The employee bears the burden of proof for
this prong.45 Garcetti greatly narrowed the speech retaliation test46 by
splitting this first prong—the citizen on a matter of public concern

39. See Roesler, supra note 7, at 398–99 (“[Following Pickering] [s]ubsequent cases served to
narrow and refine the [speech retaliation] test by focusing on the methods used and factors
employed in administering the balancing test.”); see also Kathryn B. Cooper, Garcetti v. Ceballos:
The Dual Threshold Requirement Challenging Public Employee Free Speech, 8 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L.
73, 74 (2006). Compare Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574–75, with Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. The Court
decided Mt. Healthy in 1977. The most important case law did not occur until after 1980, including
Connick, Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987), Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994), and
Garcetti. Note that the fact that these questions arise as § 1983 civil rights lawsuits may bear
responsibility for the Court’s decision to narrow the speech retaliation doctrine over time, as the fear
of lawsuits drives many of the Court’s decisions. See Nahmod, supra note 6, at 590–94 (discussing
how the § 1983 setting effects the underlying merits of the Constitutional Claim).
40. See Nahmod, supra note 6, at 569–70, 577–78 (explaining the Court’s shift from an “ad hoc”
balancing system to a system of “categorical balancing”). While the Court used to determine
employee speech protection based on an amorphous rebalancing in each case, today’s employee
speech protection is determined based on which of a series of discrete categories the speech falls
into. Id. at 569–70. See Elizabeth Dale, Employee Speech & Management Rights: A
Counterintuitive Reading of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 189 (2008)
(explaining the breakdown of the balancing of interests into two-prongs).
41. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 147–48 (1983).
42. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
43. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
44. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
45. See Sheppard v. Beerman, 317 F.3d 351, 355 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at
418 (“The first [inquiry] requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter
of public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based
on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983).
46. See Roesler, supra note 7, at 419 (explaining that the Court has greatly narrowed what can
sustain a Speech Retaliation claim for a public employee).
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prong—into two sub-elements of its own: (1) a “citizen” sub-element
and (2) a separate “matters of public concern” sub-element.47 The citizen
sub-element requires that employees’ speech is not “pursuant to their
official duties,”48 and the matters of public concern sub-element
preserves the original determination of whether or not the speech is
related to issues of public importance.49 This section will first discuss the
matters of public concern sub-element and then the citizen sub-element.
a.

The First Amendment Only Protects Employees Who Speak on a
Matter of Public Concern

Pickering established that in order to sustain a speech retaliation
claim, an employee must prove that his or her speech addressed
“matter[s] of public concern.”50 Conversely, speech that “primarily
concerns an issue that is ‘personal in nature and generally related to [the
speaker’s] own situation,’ such as his or her assignments, promotion, or
salary,” is not a matter of public concern.51 In Pickering, Marvin
Pickering, a public school teacher, wrote a letter to the editor of a
newspaper opposing a proposed tax measure designed to increase
funding to the school that employed him.52 Pickering not only wrote to
oppose the tax, but also to criticize the school board’s conduct in its
previous attempts to promote past tax increase proposals.53 He also
questioned the school’s motives in passing the latest proposal.54
Applying the principle of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan55—a case
creating broad First Amendment protection in the libel context—the
Supreme Court ruled that a public employer cannot terminate a teacher

47. Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining how the Court bifurcated the
“citizen on a matter of public concern” inquiry), cert. denied, Byrne v. Jackler, __ U.S. __, 132 S.
Ct. 1634 (2012) (mem.). It also had a great effect on the second “Pickering balancing” prong. See
infra Part II.A.2.
48. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
49. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968); see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–
48.
50. 391 U.S. at 574.
51. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 236 (alteration in original) (quoting Ezekwo v. NYC Health & Hosp.
Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 781 (2d Cir. 1991)).
52. 391 U.S. at 566.
53. Id.
54. Id. Notably, he closed his letter by stating: “I must sign this letter as a citizen, taxpayer and
voter, not as a teacher, since that freedom has been taken from the teachers by the administration.”
Id. at 578.
55. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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for speech like Pickering’s.56 The Court reasoned that because the
speech addressed a tax sent to the public for a vote, it constitutes speech
made as a citizen on “a matter of legitimate public concern.”57 Thus, the
Pickering Court held that while there is no “right” to employment, the
First Amendment still greatly limits the government’s power to
terminate employees addressing matters of public concern.”58
Further, the Pickering Court stated that protecting speech on matters
of public concern is important for reasons beyond the individual’s
interest in speaking.59 Society benefits from listening to the speech of
those working in the government60 because their public positions give
them unique knowledge and experience regarding the public
organizations that employ them.61 Protecting this societal benefit has
remained important to the Court in subsequent decisions.62
Courts determine on a case-by-case basis whether a given instance of
speech qualifies as speech made on a matter of public concern.63 Courts
will analyze “the content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record.”64 To receive protection, the speech must
“be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community.”65 A plurality declared that instead of
leaving the question to a court’s factual finding, the employer’s
reasonable belief determines what the employee said for the purposes of
conducting the speech retaliation test.66
56. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574–75.
57. Id. at 571.
58. Id. at 568 (“[T]he theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be
subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.”)
(alteration in original) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967)).
59. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 433 (2006).
60. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571–72.
61. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 433.
62. See, e.g., id. at 419; City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004); United States v. Nat’l
Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 470 (1995).
63. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 146.
66. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 677–78 (1994). The Waters plurality reasoned that the
employer is entitled to use his own, flexible procedures to determine what the employee said,
without the judiciary using its far stricter fact-finding procedures (constrained by the rules of
evidence, etc.) to second guess the employer’s reasonable conclusions. Id. at 675–76. The plurality
could not get a majority because it argued that the Court should ensure that the employer’s belief
was “reasonable.” Id. at 677–78. This “reasonableness” requires that the employer “tread with a
certain amount of care[,] . . . the care that a reasonable manager would use before making an
employment decision . . . of the sort involved in the particular case.” Id. Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas, while supporting that the employer’s belief should control, argued that the Court
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Although a court must analyze the employee speech in its entirety,
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District67 establishes that
the speech’s actual content—as opposed to whether the employee spoke
in public or private—controls whether the speech addresses matters of
public concern.68 In Givhan, a teacher named Bessie Givhan complained
privately to her employer about her school’s racially discriminatory
policies.69 The school terminated Givhan for her complaints, and she
sued for speech retaliation.70 Like the teacher in Pickering, Givhan
commented on an important public issue—racial discrimination in
schools.71 But unlike Pickering, who made his comments publically in a
newspaper, Givhan made her comments to her superior in private.72
Thus, the Court had to decide whether this difference between private
and public communication affected the matters of public concern
analysis.
The Court determined that the First Amendment protects Givhan’s
speech as a matter of public concern, even though her speech was made
privately.73 The actual content of the speech is the most important factor
in determining whether it is made on matters of public concern, rather
than the location of the speech.74
Rankin v. McPherson75 demonstrates that the offensiveness of the
speech in question does not change whether it touches on matters of
public concern.76 Rankin dealt with Ardith McPherson, who served as a
clerical worker in a local county law enforcement agency.77 She talked
with her coworker—who was also her boyfriend—about a news report

should accept the employer’s belief regardless of whether said belief is reasonable. Id. at 686 (Scalia
J., concurring in the judgment).
67. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
68. See id. at 414.
69. Id. at 411–13.
70. Id. at 411–12.
71. Id. at 411–13.
72. Id. at 412, 414.
73. Id. at 414.
74. See id. Whether the employee made the speech in private or public is not controlling.
However, the Court may still consider this as part of the speech’s context. See Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (stating that analyzing a claim requires analysis of “the content, form,
and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record”).
75. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
76. Note however, that the Court may consider offensiveness a great deal on the second
“Pickering balancing” prong discussed in Part II.A.2.
77. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 380–81.
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that an assassin had shot President Ronald Reagan.78 McPherson
criticized Ronald Reagan’s policies and said “if they go for him again, I
hope they get him.”79 Her boss learned of this comment and fired her.80
The Court stated that while her speech may be “inappropriate or
controversial,” it nevertheless qualifies as speech on matters of public
concern.81 The Court reasoned that speech regarding an attempted
assassination of the country’s leader is an issue of importance to the
public.82
Pickering, Givhan, and Rankin all protected statements on matters of
public concern—those statements which have value outside of the
employment context. In contrast, the Court in Connick v. Meyers83
declined to extend First Amendment protection to speech on matters of
private concern, where the speech’s value was limited to the employee’s
workplace.84 District Attorney Harry Connick Sr. transferred his
subordinate, Sheila Meyers, to another area of the criminal court over
her objections.85 In an attempt to garner support against her transfer,
Meyers sent a questionnaire to all of her coworkers, asking them to
comment on “office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a
grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether
employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns.”86 Connick
fired Meyers for distributing this questionnaire, and Meyers sued for
speech retaliation.87
The Court ruled that Meyer’s questionnaire did not significantly
address matters of public concern, because its value was almost
exclusively limited to “matters only of personal interest.”88 The Court
reasoned that because the questionnaire was limited to a discussion of
internal workplace policies and conflicts, it had “only a most limited”
78. Id. at 381.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 381–82. The Court reiterated its position that death threats are not protected speech, but
determined that Meyers’ speech did not qualify as a threat. Id. at 386–87.
81. Id. at 386–87.
82. Id. at 386.
83. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
84. Id. at 147–48.
85. Id. at 140–41.
86. Id. at 141.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 147, 154. The Court admitted that one question, the question discussing whether
employees felt “pressure[] to work in political campaigns,” did regard a “matter of public concern.”
Id. at 149. However, the Court ruled that “Pickering balancing” favored the employer in this case in
regards to that question. Id. at 149–54.
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“public concern” component.89 Practicality motivated the Court’s
holding as “government offices could not function if every employment
decision became a constitutional matter.”90 Through its holding in
Connick, the Supreme Court effectively narrowed the definition of
matters of public concern to only protect that speech which the public
has an interest in hearing.91
In City of San Diego v. Roe,92 the Court extended the Connick
principle—that the First Amendment does not protect speech criticizing
the workplace if that speech has no public concern component—to
purely private speech unrelated to commentary on the employee’s
workplace. In Roe, an off-duty police officer made and sold a
pornographic video featuring himself in a police uniform.93 The Police
department fired him for distributing this video.94 The Court upheld the
termination, ruling that the video did not address a matter of public
concern because pornographic videos have no connection to necessary
public information.95
b.

After Garcetti v. Ceballos, Courts Must Analyze a Citizen SubElement by Determining Whether an Employee’s Speech Was
Pursuant to Official Duties

Garcetti v. Ceballos added a new citizen sub-element to the speech
retaliation test’s first prong. In Garcetti, a defense attorney gave Deputy
District Attorney Richard Ceballos a case to review.96 Ceballos reviewed
it and concluded that the arrest warrant contained serious errors.97 He
wrote a memo to his superiors, recommending dismissal of the case.98
Ceballos argued with his superiors when they decided to pursue the case
over his objections and later reiterated his concerns about the warrant in
court.99 When he was denied a promotion and assigned lower level

89. Id. at 148, 154.
90. Id. at 143.
91. See id. at 148.
92. 543 U.S. 77 (2004).
93. Id. at 78.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 84–85.
96. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413–14 (2006). Ceballos said that “it was not unusual for
defense attorneys to ask calendar deputies to investigate aspects of pending cases.” Id.
97. Id. at 414.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 414–15.
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cases, Ceballos sued for speech retaliation.100
The Court resolved this case by creating an independent sub-element
from the word “citizen” in speech made as citizens on a matter of public
concern.101 Before Garcetti, the Court had considered speech “made as a
citizen on matter of public concern” to comprise a single test of whether
the speech addressed matters of public concern.102 After Garcetti, if the
employee spoke pursuant to official duties, then the speech did not
constitute speech made as a citizen, regardless of whether the speech
addressed matters of public concern.103
The Court stated that speech directly related to a job assignment is
pursuant to official duties, and is denied protection.104 The Court stated
that speech is not pursuant to official duties simply because the speech
addresses the subject matter of the employee’s job.105 Rather, pursuant to
official duties is only that speech with a direct connection to the
employee’s particular assignments.106 Thus, because Ceballos’ speech
was directly connected to his workplace assignment, his speech is
unprotected as pursuant to employment duties.107
When a court analyzes whether an employee spoke pursuant to
official duties under the new citizen sub-element, it engages in two
inquiries. First a court must determine the scope of the duties. Second, a
court must determine how the contested speech relates to those duties.108
Because employees originally had the burden of proving whether they
made their speech as a citizen on matters of public concern, they now
must prove both that they made their speech as citizens, and that their
speech addressed matters of public concern.109 If an employee cannot
prove both, then that employee cannot sustain a claim.110
100. Id. at 415. Ceballos’ superiors denied any retaliation whatsoever, as well as denying that
Ceballos’ speech qualifies as protected even if they did retaliate. Id.
101. See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining how the Court split the
“citizen on a matter of public concern” prong), cert. denied, Byrne v. Jackler, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct.
1634 (2012) (mem.).
102. See supra Part II.A.1.a.
103. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
104. Id. at 421–22.
105. Id. at 421.
106. Id. at 422.
107. Id. at 421, 424.
108. Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 2011).
109. See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining how the Court bifurcated
the “citizen on a matter of public concern” prong), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012)
(mem.).
110. See id.
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Although the Court identified the new citizen sub-element, it refused
to create a framework to help lower courts define what qualifies as
pursuant to employment duties.111 However, the Garcetti Court stated
that “the proper inquiry is a practical one. Formal job descriptions often
bear little resemblance to the duties an employee actually is expected to
perform.”112 Thus the first inquiry of the citizen sub-element requires the
court to determine what the employee actually does, rather than relying
upon the employee’s job description.113
The circuit courts, in attempting to apply Garcetti’s citizen subelement, have considered the following:
[W]hether the employee was commissioned or paid to make the
speech in question, the subject matter of the speech, whether the
speech was made up the chain of command, whether the
employee spoke at her place of employment, whether the speech
gave objective observers the impression that the employee
represented the employer when she spoke, whether the
employee’s speech derived from special knowledge obtained
during the course of her employment, and whether there is a socalled citizen analogue to the speech.114
Courts use these factors to determine whether speech is pursuant to
official duties, and thus whether the speech is made as a citizen.115
Circuit courts have divided into two groups regarding which factor
deserves the greatest weight. Some circuits have ruled that speech made
“up the chain of command to their superiors,” constitutes speech
pursuant to official duties.116 Other circuits have ruled that employee
speech is pursuant to official duties if the employees’ speech directly

111. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.
112. Id. at 424–25. This is designed in large part to prevent employers from “creating excessively
broad job descriptions.” Id. at 424. Justice Souter expressed this concern in his dissent, id. at 431
n.2, whose words have arguably become prophetic, as seen in Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d
1278, 1280, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009). In Abdur-Rahman, inspectors persistently asked for information
about sewer overflows from their government employer. Id. at 1280. In response, the employer
changed the inspectors’ enumerated job duties to include inspection of sewer overflow, and fired
them within two months. Id. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the termination in part because the
employer fired the employee for complaints made immediately after the change in employment
duties, as opposed to the information requests pre-dating the change. Id. at 1284.
113. Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 31; Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424–25.
114. Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 32 (citations omitted).
115. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
116. Tyler Wiese, Seeing Through the Smoke: “Official Duties” in the Wake of Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 509, 515–19 (2010). This includes the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
and Tenth Circuits. Id. at 516.
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relates to their “assigned responsibilities.”117 In any event, requiring
employees to prove that they spoke pursuant to their official duties
greatly lowers the employee’s chances of success, by increasing the
difficulty of proving the first prong.118
2.

The Pickering Balancing Prong Requires a Court to Balance
Employee Interests in Speaking Against Employer Interests in an
Efficient Workplace

If an employee proves both the citizen and matters of public concern
sub-elements of the speech retaliation test’s first prong,119 a court moves
to the second prong, called Pickering balancing.120 This balancing
requires a court to weigh the employee’s interest in speaking as a citizen
on a matter of public concern against the employer’s interest “in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.”121 While it is clear that employees bear the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that they prevail on the first
prong,122 no such clarity exists for the second prong’s burden of proof.
This section will first explain the Pickering balancing prong, and then
explain the “quasi-military” rule applicable to that prong. Finally, this
section will explain that the circuit courts are confused as to the
Pickering balancing prong’s burden of proof.
a.

Pickering Balancing Requires a Court to Balance the Employee’s
Free Speech Interest in Speaking Against the Employer’s Interest
in Promoting Workplace Efficiency

Pickering balancing is the speech retaliation test’s second prong, and
occurs only after an employee establishes that his or her speech was
spoken as a citizen on a matter of public concern.123 This balancing
analysis requires a court to balance the employee’s interest in speaking
as a citizen on a matter of public concern against the employer’s interest
“in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees.”124
117. Id. at 519–23. This includes the Fourth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. Id. at 519 n.96.
118. See Roesler, supra note 7, at 419 (explaining that the Court has greatly narrowed the test).
119. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 416.
120. See id. at 418; Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 678 (1996).
121. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417.
122. See supra Part II.A.1.a.
123. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
124. See id. at 418–19 (explaining that the Court must consider the employer’s interest in “the
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A court conducting Pickering balancing determines the damage of the
citizen speech to the efficiency of the employer’s workplace.125 The
Court’s analysis requires examining the time, the place, and the manner
of the speech.126 The Supreme Court has consistently stated that no
factor is dispositive and has refused to set a clear standard.127 Instead,
the trial court must decide each case on its unique facts.128
Certain principles guide the court’s case-by-case analysis.
Government agencies may only restrict employee speech to the extent
that it is “necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and
effectively.”129 When it acts as an employer, the State has “broader
discretion”130 to regulate speech than when it is acts as a sovereign.131
Therefore, “[t]he question becomes whether the relevant government
entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently
from a regular member of the general public.”132
The Court considers the “nature” of the employee’s speech, the
employee’s particular job within the government agency, and the overall
purpose of that agency,133 when determining whether the employee’s
speech disrupts his or her workplace.134 The Court has required that
“restrictions [the employer] imposes must be directed at speech that has
some potential to affect the entity’s operations.”135 So even if speech
would disrupt other workplaces, the employer can only restrict it if it
disrupts the employee’s particular workplace.136
Consider Rankin, for example, where the Court ruled in favor of

efficient provision of public services”).
125. See id.
126. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983).
127. Id. at 154 (“Because of the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements
by . . . public employees may be thought by their superiors . . . to furnish grounds for dismissal, we
do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to lay down a general standard against which all such
statements may be judged.”) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968)); see also
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384–85 (1987) (“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a
matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement,
as revealed by the whole record.”) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48).
128. See supra note 127.
129. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419.
130. Id. at 418.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 392 (1987).
134. Id.
135. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
136. See id.
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McPherson—an employee who expressed her hope that someone would
assassinate President Reagan.137 In Rankin, the Court conducted
Pickering balancing and ruled that McPherson’s interest in stating her
hope that someone would kill President Reagan outweighed her
employer’s interest in workplace harmony.138 McPherson served as a
clerical worker in a local law enforcement agency but had no connection
to the law enforcement work.139 The Court thus did not think that the
death wish would seriously harm the functioning of McPherson’s
workplace.140
Conversely, consider Connick, where the Court upheld Sheila
Meyers’ termination for her speech criticizing the operation of the
prosecutor’s office where she worked.141 In Connick, Pickering
balancing led the Court to rule against the employee because her
questionnaire concerned her personal workplace grievances.142 Thus, the
more attenuated the connection between the employee’s speech and her
work, the more likely that the employee’s interests will outweigh the
employer’s interests,143 because the speech is less likely to threaten
workplace harmony if it has nothing to do with the employee’s job.144
Connick addressed the question of how to deal with speech that was
mostly of private concern but had a small amount of public concern. In
Connick, the Court explained that the employer’s burden of proving that
137. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 386.
138. Id. at 380, 392. Justice Powell cast the deciding vote. In his concurrence he stated:
There is no dispute that McPherson’s comment was made during a private conversation
with a co-worker who happened also to be her boyfriend. She had no intention or
expectation that it would be overheard or acted on by others. . . . If a statement is on a
matter of public concern, as it was here, it will be an unusual case where the employer’s
legitimate interests will be so great as to justify punishing an employee for this type of
private speech that routinely takes place at all levels in the workplace. The risk that a
single, offhand comment directed to only one other worker will lower morale, disrupt the
work force, or otherwise undermine the mission of the office borders on the fanciful. To the
extent that the full constitutional analysis of the competing interests is required, I generally
agree with the Court’s opinion.
Id. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 392.
140. Id.
141. Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983).
142. See id. at 152.
143. Compare id., with Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390–92.
144. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 392; see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 152. This general concept of the
importance of the speech’s connection to the workplace in analyzing “Pickering balancing” is what
the Garcetti Court used to form the “citizen” sub-element, disallowing suits where the speech is
“pursuant to official duties” from even reaching “Pickering balancing.” See Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410, 422–24 (2006) (explaining how Connick and Pickering support the Garcetti holding).
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it prevails on Pickering balancing varies depending on how strongly
connected the speech is to matters of public concern.145 The Court
determined that the questionnaire at issue was almost devoid of public
concern.146 However the Court determined that one question, regarding
pressure to participate on political campaigns, constituted a matter of
public concern.147 The Court said “the State’s burden in justifying a
particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee’s
expression.”148 Thus, the greater the connection between the speech at
issue and matters of public concern, the more protection it is entitled to,
and vice versa.149 Because the speech in Connick “touched upon matters
of public concern in only a most limited sense,”150 the employer had a
low burden.151 Meyers lost under Pickering balancing because of that
low burden.152
The location where the speech occurred matters more in the Pickering
balancing analysis than in the previous citizen on a matter of public
concern analysis.153 Where the speech is public, the Court will primarily
focus on how the content of the speech affects work-place harmony.154
Where the speech is private, the court will consider the time, place, and
manner of the speech and how such factors affect work-place
145. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150.
146. Id. at 154 (“Myers’ questionnaire touched upon matters of public concern in only a most
limited sense; her survey, in our view, is most accurately characterized as an employee grievance
concerning internal office policy.”).
147. Id. at 149.
148. Id. at 150.
149. See id.; see also Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 237 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, Byrne v.
Jackler, No. 11-517, 2012 WL 603078 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2012).
150. Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.
151. See id. at 149–50, 154 (explaining that the District Court placed too high a burden on the
employer, because “[t]he limited First Amendment interest involved here does not require that
Connick tolerate action which he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his
authority, and destroy close working relationships”).
152. See id.
153. Compare Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414, 415 n.4 (1979), with
Connick, 461 U.S. at 149-50, 154.
154. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415 n.4 (“Although the First Amendment’s protection of government
employees extends to private as well as public expression, striking the Pickering balance in each
context may involve different considerations. When a teacher speaks publicly, it is generally the
content of his statements that the court must assess to determine whether they in any way either
impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or . . . interfered with
the regular operation of the schools generally. . . . Private expression, however, may in some
situations bring additional factors to the Pickering calculus. When a government employee
personally confronts his immediate superior, the employing agency’s institutional efficiency may be
threatened not only by the content of the employee’s message but also by the manner, time, and
place in which it is delivered.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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harmony.155
b.

Some Lower Courts Apply Pickering Balancing with Increased
Deference Towards Quasi-Military Employers

Some circuit courts have applied the second prong—Pickering
balancing—with heightened deference towards employers who qualify
as quasi-military organizations.156 Quasi-military organizations are those
organizations possessing a strong connection to public safety, including
police officers,157 firefighters,158 and border patrol agents.159 Courts
adopting the theory assert that when conducting the balancing analysis,
courts should allow quasi-military organizations extra deference in firing
disobedient employees because the employers’ public safety purpose
increases their “need to secure discipline, mutual respect, trust and
particular efficiency among the ranks.”160 Thus, these circuit courts give
employers extra deference in the public safety context, greatly benefiting
such quasi-military employers at the expense of employee speech.
Circuit courts that adopt the quasi-military rule justify it by extending
the Supreme Court’s holding in Kelley v. Johnson161 to the speech
retaliation context.162 In Kelley, a police officer challenged the police
department’s hair grooming regulations under the Fourteenth
Amendment right to liberty (as opposed to a First Amendment free
speech challenge).163 The Supreme Court ruled that the regulations did
not violate his Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty.164 The Court
stated that regardless of whether the quasi-military exception applied in

155. See id. (“Private expression . . . may in some situations bring additional factors to the
Pickering calculus,” including “the manner, time, and place in which [the speech] is delivered”); see
also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 389 (1987) (indicating the importance of time, place, and
manner with private speech, suggesting that “[t]here is no suggestion that any member of the
general public was present or heard McPherson’s statement” in justifying protecting her speech
under “Pickering balancing”).
156. See, e.g., Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1293 (11th Cir. 2000); Kokkinis
v. Ivkovich, 185 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 1999); Dunn v. Carroll, 40 F.3d 287, 292 (8th Cir. 1994);
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 955 F.2d 998, 1004 (5th Cir. 1992).
157. Oladeinde, 230 F.3d at 1293.
158. Figueroa-Rodrigues v. Lopez-Rivera, 878 F.2d 1488, 1489 (1st Cir. 1998).
159. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 955 F.2d at 1004.
160. Anderson v. Burke Cnty., 239 F.3d 1216, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hansen v.
Soldenwagner, 19 F.3d 573, 577 (11th Cir. 1994)) (citation omitted).
161. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
162. See, e.g., Hansen, 19 F.3d at 577.
163. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 239–41 (1976).
164. Id. at 248–49.
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this case, the police department had a unique need to maintain its “esprit
de corps.”165 The Court considered it “highly significant” that the police
officer limited his challenge to his Fourteenth Amendment interest.166
Employers are entitled to far more deference in regards to employees’
liberty challenges than those “based on the explicit language of the First
Amendment.”167 Thus, because the police officer in Kelley was asserting
only a Fourteenth Amendment liberty challenge, the court gave greater
deference to the employer than it would have if it were a free speech
claim. The deference given to employers regarding Fourteenth
Amendment liberty claims led the Court to apply rational basis review to
the case and uphold the hair grooming regulations.168
c.

The Circuits Inconsistently Interpret Who Bears the Burden of
Proving Pickering Balancing

The circuit courts are not consistent in their interpretation of who
bears the burden of proving Pickering balancing. Most circuits have
stated that the specific burden courts will apply when engaging in the
balancing prong belongs with the employer.169 However, the Eleventh
Circuit has consistently ruled that the burden on the balancing analysis
belongs with the employee.170 Meanwhile, the Tenth Circuit goes back
and forth on who has the burden.171
165. Id. at 246. “This view was based upon the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that the ‘unique
judicial deference’ accorded by the judiciary to regulation of members of the military was
inapplicable because there was no historical or functional justification for the characterization of the
police as ‘para-military.’ But the conclusion that such cases are inapposite, however correct, in no
way detracts from the deference due Suffolk County’s choice of an organizational structure for its
police force.” Id.
166. Id. at 244–45 (“Respondent has sought the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, not as a
member of the citizenry at large, but on the contrary as an employee of the police
department . . . . We think . . . [this distinction] is highly significant.”). At the Supreme Court level,
only dissents have suggested that an organization’s “quasi-military” nature should apply in the First
Amendment context. See Saye v. Williams, 452 U.S. 926, 929 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 401 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. See supra note 166.
168. Kelley, 425 U.S. at 247.
169. See, e.g., Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009); Commc’ns Workers of Am.
v. Ector Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 467 F.3d 427, 436–37 (5th Cir. 2006); McGreal v. Ostrov, 368 F.3d 657,
672 (7th Cir. 2004); Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 193 (2d Cir. 2003); Kincade v. City of
Blue Springs, 64 F.3d 389, 397 (8th Cir. 1995); Watters v. City of Phila., 55 F.3d 886, 895 (3d Cir.
1995); Am. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 830 F.2d 294, 303–04 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
170. See, e.g., Douglas v. DeKalb Cnty., 308 F. App’x 396, 399 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009); Boyce v.
Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333, 1342 n.12 (11th Cir. 2007); Anderson v. Burke Cnty., 239 F.3d 1216, 1219
(11th Cir. 2001).
171. See Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 933 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating in one
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The circuit courts’ confusion stems from the fact that the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence is insufficiently clear as to whether employees or
employers bear the burden of proving that they prevail on Pickering
balancing. Most of the time, the Court has avoided the issue, saying only
that the Court must balance.172 In Mt. Healthy Board of Education v.
Doyle,173 the Court stated that the employee must establish that his
speech was “constitutionally protected.”174 It also said that Pickering
balancing constituted a factor of whether speech was “constitutionally
protected,” implying that employees have the burden of proving that
they prevail under the analysis.175
However, properly reading the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence reveals
that the employer bears the burden of proving Pickering balancing.176
Rankin solidifies this principle with the following language:
Because McPherson’s statement addressed a matter of public
concern, Pickering next requires that we balance McPherson’s
interest in making her statement against the interest of the State,
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees. The State bears a
burden of justifying the discharge on legitimate grounds.177
Most circuits have followed the Court’s lead in these cases and required

paragraph that “[the plaintiff] must still show that his interest in the speech outweighed the
government’s countervailing interest in regulating the speech to maintain an effective working
environment,” but stating in another paragraph that “the State’s burden in justifying a particular
discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee’s expression”). Compare Saurini v.
Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist., 191 F. App’x 628, 632 (10th Cir. 2006) (implying that the burden is with
the employee to establish “Pickering balancing” by stating that “[i]f these three factors [including
“Pickering balancing”] are met, the burden shifts to the employer to establish [the fourth factor]”)
(emphasis added), with Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1207 (10th
Cir. 2007) (“Apparently, [the District Court’s determination that the employee failed to prove
“Pickering balancing”] is premised on an error of law, as the employer bears the burden of
justifying its regulation of the employee’s speech.”) (emphasis in original) (citing Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983)).
172. See White v. State, 131 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 929 P.2d 396, 405 (1997) (“The Supreme Court
does not discuss the [Pickering balancing prong] in terms of burdens of proof but rather says that ‘it
is the court’s task’ to balance the interests of the employee against the interests of the employer and
to determine, as a matter of law, which of those interests is greater.”) (citing Waters v. Churchill,
511 U.S. 661, 667–69 (1994); Connick, 461 U.S. at 142; Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
569 (1968); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385–86 (1987)).
173. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
174. Id. at 287.
175. Id. at 284 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569).
176. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.
177. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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the employer to prove that it prevails on Pickering balancing.178
3.

The Employee’s Protected Speech Must Have Caused the
Termination

If the employee makes it through the first citizen on a matter of public
concern prong and the second Pickering balancing prong, the Court
moves to the third “causation” prong, which requires a court to
determine whether the employee’s speech caused his termination.179
Causation has two sub-elements of its own.180 The burden of proof is on
the employee for causation’s first sub-element, and on the employer for
the second sub-element.181
The Court defined the nature of the causation prong in Mt. Healthy. In
Mt. Healthy, a public school chose not to rehire a teacher who made
inappropriate and offensive comments on a regular basis.182 However,
one of the school’s key reasons for refusing to rehire him was that he
wrote a memorandum criticizing the school’s new dress code.183 The
school promoted the dress code with the design of increasing support for
proposed school bonds.184 The teacher delivered the speech to a radio
disc jockey, who broadcasted it on the radio.185 The trial court ruled that
the radio address was “clearly constitutionally protected.”186
The Mt. Healthy Court created a causation prong with two subelements.187 The Court explicitly gave the burden of proof to the
employee for the first sub-element and to the employer for the second
sub-element.188 For the first sub-element, the employee must prove to a
court that his or her protected speech was a “substantial factor”
178. See supra note 169.
179. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Among other things, Doyle made obscene gestures to cafeteria staff, and made comments to
a teacher that resulted in said teacher slapping him. Id. at 281–82.
183. Id. at 282–83.
184. Id. at 282.
185. Id. at 282–83.
186. See id. at 283 (“The District Court . . . concluded that respondent Doyle’s telephone call to
the radio station was ‘clearly protected by the First Amendment’ . . . . The District Court did not
expressly state what test it was applying in determining that the incident in question involved
conduct protected by the First Amendment, but simply held that the communication to the radio
station was such conduct. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion.”) (citations
omitted).
187. See id. at 287.
188. Id.
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contributing to his or her termination.189 Once the employee establishes
this, the second sub-element allows the employer to affirmatively defend
against the suit by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have fired the employee even if the employee had not uttered the
protected speech.190
B.

Garcetti Blurred the Distinction Between the Citizen on a Matter of
Public Concern Prong and the Pickering Balancing Prong, Further
Complicating the Speech Retaliation Analysis

Until recently, the three prongs discussed above comprised the speech
retaliation test: (1) citizen on a matter of public concern, (2) Pickering
balancing, and (3) causation. However, the Garcetti Court further
complicated this framework by blurring the lines between the first and
second speech retaliation prongs.
In Garcetti, the Court created a “citizen” sub-element to the first
prong of speech retaliation, and used it to hold that Ceballos’ speech was
unprotected because it was pursuant to his employment duties.191 One of
the Court’s main rationales for doing this was that when balancing the
employee and employer interests in the context of workplace
assignments, the employer’s interest in workplace effectiveness is
entitled to additional weight.192
Garcetti’s rationale blurs the first and second prongs by using the
second prong’s balancing test to justify adopting the citizen sub-element
of the first prong.193 In doing this, the Court balanced the employer’s
interests against the employee’s when analyzing the first prong of speech
retaliation.194 Such a mixing of prongs is contrary to the Court’s

189. See id.
190. See id. The Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Doyle’s claim
survived the new holding. Id. The district court determined that the employer succeeded on the
second sub-element, as the School Board “established by a preponderance of the evidence that
Doyle would not have been renewed because of the incidents—exclusive of the radio incident—
which had occurred during the year or so prior to the nonrenewal.” Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 670 F.2d 59, 61 (6th Cir. 1982) (quoting the trial court and upholding the trial
court’s ruling on remand).
191. See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 235, 238 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at
420–22), cert denied Byrne v. Jackler, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012) (mem.).
192. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422–23 (2006) (“[The Court’s holding] is supported by
the emphasis of our precedents on affording government employers sufficient discretion to manage
their operations. Employers have heightened interests in controlling speech made by an employee in
his or her professional capacity.”).
193. See Nahmod, supra note 6, at 571.
194. See id.
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traditional test, which did not engage in Pickering balancing until the
employee prevailed on the first prong.195 Despite this, the Garcetti Court
states that the balancing should not occur where the speech fails to pass
the citizen sub-element of the first prong.196
Thus, the Garcetti Court created a new underlying principle that
extends beyond the citizen sub-element.197 Where employee speech
clearly fails to prevail on the second prong of Pickering balancing, a
court will dispose of the claim at the first prong without addressing the
second prong.198 The Court’s maneuver serves as a kind of preliminary
Pickering balancing, as the Court will deny categories of speech
protection where Pickering balancing strongly disfavors such speech
before technically reaching that very balancing analysis.199 The Court’s
decision provides another method of disposing of the employee’s claim
at the first prong, thus increasing the difficulty an employee faces in
establishing a claim.
III. PUBLIC EMPLOYERS SHOULD HAVE TO PROVE THE
PICKERING BALANCING PRONG BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE
As discussed above, the speech retaliation test consists of three
prongs. The first is to determine whether the speech is made as a citizen
on a matter of public concern. The second prong requires a balancing of
the employee’s interest in speaking against the employer’s interest in
running an efficient workplace. Finally, the Court considers the third
prong of causation.
Pickering balancing has an unclear burden of proof.200 This Comment
argues first that employers should have the burden of proving that they
prevail under the balancing analysis, and second that the Court should
set the employer’s burden at clear and convincing evidence.

195. See supra Part II.A.2.
196. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423 (“When an employee speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of
public concern, the First Amendment requires a delicate balancing of the competing interests
surrounding the speech and its consequences. When, however, the employee is simply performing
his or her job duties, there is no warrant for a similar degree of scrutiny.”) (emphasis added).
197. See Nahmod, supra note 6, at 571.
198. See id.
199. Sheldon Nahmod points out that this serves as part of the Court’s trend of moving away
from “ad hoc balancing” where the court does an uncontrolled balancing at each case to “categorical
balancing,” where what speech is protected turns on which of a series of discrete categories it falls
into. See Nahmod, supra note 6, at 569–73.
200. See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court Precedent Indicates that the Employer Should Bear
the Burden of Proof on Pickering Balancing

Much confusion exists as to whether the burden of proof on the
second prong of Pickering balancing should fall on the employer or the
employee.201 However, an analysis of Supreme Court precedent shows
that employers should have the burden of proving that they prevail on
Pickering balancing.202 Mt. Healthy is the only Supreme Court precedent
cited by the minority of courts that place the burden of this balancing
analysis on the employee.203 In Mt. Healthy, the Court said that the
burden of proving that the employee’s speech was constitutionally
protected was “properly placed upon [the employee].”204 It stated that
Pickering balancing is a factor in determining whether speech is
constitutionally protected.205 Some courts have interpreted this statement
to mean that employees bear the burden of proving that they prevail on
Pickering balancing.206
However, the courts are incorrect in interpreting Mt. Healthy as
setting the Pickering balancing burden against the employee. First, Mt.
Healthy addressed a question of the burden of causation, which is
entirely different from the balancing analysis.207 Mt. Healthy is properly
read as being limited to the causation question, which is irrelevant to the
question of the burdens of Pickering balancing.208
201. Compare Anderson v. Burke Cnty., 239 F.3d 1216, 1219 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that the
employee must prove “Pickering balancing”), with Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir.
2009) (stating that the burden is with the employer); see also White v. State, 131 Wash. 2d 1, 13,
929 P.2d 396, 404–05 (1997) (“The nature of the balancing analysis required under
Pickering . . . appear[s] to have created some confusion with respect to which party has the ‘burden
of proving’ [it].”).
202. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (stating that the employer must prove
“Pickering balancing”).
203. See, e.g., Anderson, 239 F.3d at 1219 (stating that the employee must prove “Pickering
balancing”); Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 931 (10th Cir. 1995).
204. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
205. Id. at 284 (“[W]hether speech of a State employee is constitutionally protected expression
necessarily entails striking ‘a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’”) (quoting
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
206. See Anderson, 239 F.3d at 1219.
207. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 286–87 (addressing whether the employer could defend by
proving that the employer would have fired the employee even in absence of the protected speech).
208. See id. at 284–85 (stating that the Court accepts the district court’s ruling on “Pickering
balancing” and then moves on to the “Causation” question); see also Local 144 Nursing Home
Pension Fund v. Demisay, 508 U.S. 581, 592 n.5 (1993) (“It was, if anything, those dicta
themselves—uninvited, unargued, and unnecessary to the Court’s holdings—which insulted [the
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Second, and most importantly, the Court decided Mt. Healthy before
much of the case law that fractured speech retaliation law into a complex
series of prongs and sub-elements.209 When the Court decided Mt.
Healthy, speech retaliation law constituted one large amorphous
principle, not yet broken down into the previously discussed parts.210
The Court had not broken down the test because the Court’s primary
purpose in Pickering was to state that a balancing analysis actually
existed.211 The Court waited until future cases to clarify the analysis.212
The Court specified the doctrine in the 1980s with cases such as
Connick and Rankin, long after deciding Mt. Healthy.213 In clarifying,
the Court separated the citizen on a matter of public concern prong from
the Pickering balancing prong.214 At that time, the Court clarified that the
determination of whether speech is constitutionally protected does not
include Pickering balancing, but instead precedes it.215
In Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr,216 the Court added
further support to this ordering of the speech retaliation test.217 Umbehr
states that after the employee proves that his conduct qualifies as
constitutionally protected, “termination because of [that speech] may be
justified when legitimate countervailing government interests are
sufficiently strong.”218 Thus, Pickering balancing occurs only after a
court has determined that the speech is constitutionally protected.
virtue of judicial restraint]; and we would add injury to insult by according them precedential
effect.”).
209. The Court decided Mt. Healthy in 1977. The most important case law did not occur until
after 1980, including Connick, Rankin, and Garcetti. See Garcetti v. Caballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006);
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
210. See supra Part II.A.
211. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
212. See Roesler, supra note 7, at 398–99 (“[Following Pickering,] [s]ubsequent cases served to
narrow and refine the [Speech Retaliation] test by focusing on the methods used and factors
employed in administering the balancing [prong].”); see also Cooper, supra note 39, at 74.
213. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388; Connick, 461 U.S. at 149–50; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at
418. A similar doctrinal split occurred between “a citizen on a matter of public concern,” resulting
in a sub-element for “citizen,” and a separate sub-element for “matters of public concern.” See
Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420–22), cert
denied Byrne v. Jackler, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012) (mem.); see also Dale, supra note 40, at
189 (explaining the breakdown of the balancing of interests into two prongs).
214. See supra note 213.
215. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996). Compare Pickering, 391 U.S.
at 568, with Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (showing how the speech retaliation doctrine has changed
over time).
216. 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
217. Id. at 675.
218. Id.
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As the speech retaliation test has evolved, the Court gave employees
the burden of proving that they spoke as a citizen on a matter of public
concern219 but gave employers the burden of proving that they prevail on
Pickering balancing.220 When discussing the balancing analysis in
Rankin, the Court stated that “[t]he State bears a burden of justifying the
discharge on legitimate grounds.”221 Rankin shows that when the Court
reaches the Pickering balancing prong the Court requires the employer
to prove that its justification for terminating the employee outweighs the
employee’s interest in speaking.
While Rankin provides the Court’s most direct statement that the
employer bears the burden of proof under Pickering balancing, many
Supreme Court cases lend additional support to this assertion.222 For
example, the Connick Court stated that “the state’s burden in justifying a
particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee’s
expression.”223 Garcetti also supports the assertion that employers bear
the burden of proof when the Court conducts Pickering balancing.
Garcetti states that once the Court reaches that second prong, “the
question becomes whether the relevant government entity had an
adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any
other member of the general public.”224
The speech retaliation test’s underlying rationale further supports that
the employer has the burden of proving that it prevails on Pickering
balancing.225 Pickering’s underlying rationale is that because the State
has unique and important interests as an employer, those interests justify
courts granting the government greater deference in regulating its
employees’ speech.226
Thus, regulating employee speech is different only because the
219. Sheppard v. Beerman, 317 F.3d 351, 355 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d
225, 235 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining how the Court bifurcated the “citizen on a matter of public
concern” prong), cert. denied, Byrne v. Jackler, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012) (mem.).
220. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388 (stating that the employer must prove “Pickering balancing”).
221. Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
222. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.
410, 418 (2006).
223. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149–50. While the Connick Court ruled that the court placed too high
of a burden on the state in the particular case, it made clear that the employer always bears the
burden of proof on Pickering balancing. It is simply a burden set at different levels depending on
the particular case. See id.
224. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
225. See generally Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
226. See id. (“[T]he State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees
that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the
citizenry in general.”) (emphasis added).
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employer’s interests “differ significantly” from regulating citizen
speech.227 If speech reaches Pickering balancing, the employee has
already shown that he spoke as a citizen on matters of public concern.228
Therefore the employee has already demonstrated that his speech is
equivalent to the speech of a general citizen in Pickering’s terms.229
Once the employee has made this showing, courts should require the
employer to counteract the employee’s proven assertion—that his speech
is the speech of a regular citizen—by proving that the employment
context justifies regulating the employee’s speech in a manner
significantly different than a regular citizen’s speech.
B.

The Court Should Require the State to Prove Pickering Balancing
with Clear and Convincing Evidence

As the previous section demonstrates, the burden of proof on the
Pickering balancing prong is properly placed with the State.230 However,
while the question of who bears the burden is confusing, so too is the
question of how the Court should apply this burden.231 This confusion
encourages courts to conduct the balancing in a haphazard manner to
reach a desired result in each case, rather than engaging in rigorous
analysis.232
Clarifying the height of the employer’s burden will help tidy up the
speech retaliation test. This section argues that only speech having the
strongest connection to matters of public concern ever reaches the
Pickering balancing prong of the current speech retaliation test, and thus
all such speech is entitled to a higher burden of proof. This section also
argues that because clear and convincing evidence is the standard that
courts use to raise the burden against the State in the First Amendment
context, courts should extend this practice to the speech retaliation
context.

227. See id.
228. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
229. See id.
230. See supra Part III.A.
231. Anne Gasperini DeMarco, The Qualified Immunity Quagmire in Public Employees’ Section
1983 Free Speech Cases, 25 REV. LITIG. 349, 377–78 (2006) (explaining the “widely different
evidentiary burdens” that courts apply).
232. Id. at 365–66.
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The Employer Should Have to Satisfy a High Burden of Proof for
Employee Speech That Reaches Pickering Balancing

Employers should face a high burden in proving that their interests
outweigh those of employees for speech surviving to the Pickering
balancing prong because speech that reaches this second prong has the
strongest connection to matters of public concern. Connick declared that
“Pickering unmistakably states . . . that the State’s burden in justifying a
particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee’s
expression.”233 Thus, the closer that speech is related to “internal office
policy,” the lower the burden of proof.234 Likewise, the stronger the
employee’s argument that the speech is made as “a citizen on a matter of
public concern,” the higher the burden of proof the employer should
face.235
Consider this scaling burden of proof in light of the modern speech
retaliation jurisprudence. With every case, the Court has narrowed the
speech that qualifies as that made by a citizen on a matter of public
concern.236 The narrowing occurred in Connick, when the Court ruled
that protection did not extend to people speaking on internal
employment issues.237 The Waters principle supported by seven justices
of the Court—that what the employer believes the employee said
controls238—further increases the likelihood employers will prevail by
consistently favoring the employer where a legitimate dispute exists as
to what the employee said.
233. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983). In Connick, the Court overturned the district
court for placing too high of a burden on “Pickering balancing.” Id. at 154. However, the Supreme
Court only did this because they believed that Meyer’s speech “touched upon matters of public
concern in only a most limited sense,” id., determining that her speech was “most accurately
characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal office policy.” Id. The Court
determined that her speech was therefore entitled to the lowest of Connick’s floating burden. See id.
at 149–50, 154.
234. Id. at 153–54.
235. See id. at 150; see also McBee v. Jim Hogg Cnty., 730 F.2d 1009, 1017 (5th Cir. 1984)
(explaining that the Pickering balancing prong “require[es] a stronger showing of disruption as the
employees’ speech moves closer to core ‘public concerns’”) (citing Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1692).
236. Roesler, supra note 7, at 419 (explaining that the Court has greatly narrowed the speech
retaliation test).
237. See Karin B. Hoppmann, Concern with Public Concern: Toward A Better Definition of the
Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L. REV. 993, 1018 (1997) (explaining that Connick, by
requiring the employee to prove that his speech regards “matters of public concern,” switched First
Amendment jurisprudence from making protection of speech the default (with narrow exceptions
for the State) to making State regulating speech the default (with the employee having to get into a
narrow exception of “matters of public concern”)).
238. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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The Court narrowed the speech retaliation test even further in
Garcetti. To even reach Pickering balancing, employees must now prove
not only that their speech relates to matters of public concern but also
that the speech was not pursuant to their official duties.239 If they cannot
prove both sub-elements, then the Court never reaches the balancing
prong, which only comes after the employee establishes that he or she is
speaking as a citizen on matters of public concern.240
Following Garcetti, courts must engage in a preliminary Pickering
balancing at the citizen on a matter of public concern prong before even
reaching Pickering balancing itself.241 Preliminary Pickering balancing
further narrows the test, as employees fired for speech that is far out of
balance in favor of the employer have their cases dismissed before
reaching the balancing analysis.242
The narrowing of the test means that the speech, which still manages
to pass the first prong and reach Pickering balancing, constitutes that
speech with the strongest connection to matters of public concern.
Combining this with Connick’s statement—that the employer’s burden
of proving that it prevails under the balancing analysis increases where
the speech has a stronger relationship to matters of public concern—
reveals that speech reaching Pickering balancing in the modern
jurisprudence is entitled to a high burden of proof.243 Thus the Court
should require employers to face a high burden of proof when arguing
that speech making it to Pickering balancing is sufficiently disruptive to
outweigh the employee’s protected interests.244

239. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
240. See id. at 418.
241. See supra Part II.B.
242. See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text.
243. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150–54 (1983).
244. Note that Justice Souter’s dissent in Garcetti indirectly supports this. Souter stated that the
court should make the second prong of “Pickering balancing” harsher against employees whose
speech is “pursuant to their official duties.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 434–35 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Souter’s goal in harshly applying “Pickering balancing” was to make it less friendly to the employee
as an alternative to the majority’s even more employee unfriendly “citizen” sub-element. Id.
Therefore, because the majority instituted the restrictive “citizen” sub-element, there is no need for
“Pickering balancing” itself to have strict application, and the Court should therefore interpret it
leniently against the employee. Id. at 433–34 (explaining that the Court chose to protect employer’s
interest in running a harmonious workplace by making the categorical “citizen” exclusion as an
alternative to Souter’s idea of making the Pickering balancing prong harsher).
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The Court Should Use Clear and Convincing Evidence to Raise the
Employer’s Burden of Proof Under Pickering Balancing

The Court should apply a high burden against the State when
conducting Pickering balancing, by setting that burden at clear and
convincing evidence. In other First Amendment contexts, courts apply a
clear and convincing evidence standard in order to provide extra
assurance that burden-holders have proven their case before courts take
action against speech.245
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court required that the
plaintiff prove “actual malice” with “convincing clarity,” in order to
sustain a libel claim against a public figure.246 It did this because of the
crucial importance the First Amendment has in the press context.247 The
clear and convincing evidence requirement provided an extra level of
protection to ensure that the plaintiff actually proved actual malice,
before the Court took action.248 The Court’s intent in using the higher
evidentiary burden was to ensure that courts do not accidently restrict
speech too greatly.249
The Pickering balancing prong is very similar to the libel context. In
both situations, the Court wants to ensure that employee speech with the
strongest connection to matters of public concern is not restricted
beyond what the First Amendment allows.250 It is true that courts have
established that the public employer has greater interests in the
employment context than in other free speech contexts such as libel.251
However, the employer’s unique interests in the employment context
are relevant only to what the employer must prove, not the procedural
burden of proof placed upon the employer. In Sullivan’s libel context,
the plaintiff had to prove the high substantive standard of actual

245. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 255 n.28 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“The purpose of this standard of proof, [is] to reduce the chances of
inappropriate decisions . . . .”).
246. 376 U.S. 254, 285–86 (1964). The Court has maintained this requirement. Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 508 (1991); Stepnes v. Ritschel, 663 F.3d 952, 963 (8th Cir.
2011).
247. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270–71.
248. See id. at 279–83.
249. See id. at 282–83; see also Harper, 494 U.S. at 255 n.28 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The purpose of [the clear and convincing evidence] standard of proof, [is] to
reduce the chances of inappropriate decisions . . . .”).
250. Compare New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 282–83, with Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 568 (1968) (both discussing the importance of avoiding too much restriction of speech).
251. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
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malice.252 The Court set the burden of proof at convincing clarity to
provide extra insurance that the accuser proved actual malice before the
State took action.253
In the speech retaliation context, the employer bears the burden of
proof on the more employer-friendly substantive standard of Pickering
balancing.254 This balancing standard is far more generous to the State
than actual malice255 or the First Amendment’s traditional “narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling Government interest”256 test. Thus the
lowered substantive standard of Pickering balancing provides the
necessary additional weight to employer interests.257 Setting the
procedural burden at clear and convincing evidence to provide extra
insurance that the employer has met its burden under the balancing does
not prevent the balancing prong’s substantive standard from sufficiently
taking the State’s interests as an employer into account.
Thus, courts should extend the practice of requiring the government
to prove its case with clear and convincing evidence in First Amendment
contexts to Pickering balancing. Requiring the State to meet this high
procedural burden will ensure that the employer has fully proven its
claim of workplace disruption before acting against speech. Meanwhile,
the balancing’s substantive nature will protect the government’s unique
interests as an employer.
IV. COURTS SHOULD FAVOR EMPLOYEE SPEECH WHEN
ANALYZING LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES
COMMENTING ON THE DRUG WAR
This section will argue that courts should analyze speech from law
enforcement employees opposing the war on drugs in a manner that
favors the employee speech. First, courts should rule that plaintiffs pass
the first prong of speech retaliation, as commentary on the war on drugs

252. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 285–86.
253. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 255 n.28 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
254. See supra Part II.A.2.
255. Compare Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, with New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80
(showing how much more speaker-friendly the “actual malice” standard is than the “Pickering
balancing” prong).
256. Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000)). Compare Pickering, 391 U.S. at
568, with Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 646 (citing Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 813)
(showing how much more speaker-friendly the narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest
standard is than the Pickering balancing prong).
257. See supra note 256.
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is made as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Second, when
engaging in the second prong of Pickering balancing, courts should
refuse to apply the quasi-military rule because Supreme Court precedent
does not support its existence.
A.

Courts Should Rule that Commentary on the War on Drugs
Constitutes Speech as a Citizen on a Matter of Public Concern

When law enforcement employees fired for commenting on the war
on drugs sue for First Amendment speech retaliation, courts should rule
that the speech is citizen speech because it is not pursuant to official
duties and because the speech proposes a change in public policy.
1.

Commentary Concerning the War on Drugs Constitutes Citizen
Speech Because Such Speech Is Not Pursuant to Official Duties

Courts should rule that drug enforcement employees commenting on
the war on drugs generally are not speaking pursuant to their official
duties. The Garcetti Court ruled that Ceballos made his speech pursuant
to official duties because the commentary leading to his firing
constituted a critical part of an official assignment.258 Because Ceballos’
employers fired him for speech arising directly from that assignment, the
Court ruled it pursuant to official duties.259
Where employers fire employees for commenting on their specific job
assignments or complaining directly to their superiors, then the
employers have a strong case under Garcetti. However, in the cases of
commentary on the war on drugs discussed above, the employees are
typically speaking either off the cuff or out in public.260 Further, they are
speaking in general terms about the government’s drug policy, rather
than a particular assignment or mission designed to effectuate that
policy.261
While the speech addresses matters related to their workplace’s
subject matter, this does not mean that the speech is pursuant to their
official duties, regardless of whether the Court applies the “assigned
responsibilities” or “up the chain of command” analysis.262 Speech on
the war on drugs (at least in the above cases) was not made to a superior,
258. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 414–15, 421–22 (2006). The speech regarded a report on
the sufficiency of a warrant. Id.
259. Id.
260. See supra Part I.
261. See supra Part I.
262. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.
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and thus was not “up the chain of command.” Further, the speech did not
constitute part of an actual assignment and thus did not relate to the
employee’s “assigned responsibilities.”263
The speech at issue in the above cases is more analogous to the
speech that the Court upheld in Rankin.264 The Court felt comfortable
adding the citizen sub-element in Garcetti only because it would not
touch speech unrelated to work assignments.265 Thus the pursuant to
their official duties rule only touches speech directly related to
workplace assignments.266 Thus, speech in support of a policy position,
not related to an employee’s work assignment, is exactly the speech
Garcetti protected.267
2.

Commentary on the War on Drugs Addresses Matters of Public
Concern by Proposing a Change in Public Policy

Courts should not only rule that commentary on the war on drugs is
citizen speech, but should also rule that such speech addresses matters of
public concern, because the speech proposes a change in public policy.
The Court has stated that one of the key determinants of whether speech
addresses a matter of public concern is whether the speech will help
inform the public.268 Not only does the employee have a right to deliver
speech that will inform the public, but the public gains important
information in hearing opinions from employees, because employees can
contribute their unique knowledge about their government employer’s
work.269 For this reason, speech that informs the public is speech
addressing matters of public concern.
The speech of employees on the “front lines” of the drug war—such
as police officers and border patrol agents—constitutes the epitome of
speech on matters of public concern. After all, these employees have
direct contact with the successes and failures of the war on drugs.
Therefore, they are uniquely qualified in knowledge and experience to
comment on whether the drug war should continue. Law enforcement
employees’ unique knowledge on the subject of the drug war is
analogous to the unique knowledge that the teacher in Pickering had
263. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.
264. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 380–86 (1987).
265. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006).
266. See id. at 422–23.
267. See id.
268. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004).
269. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571–72 (1968).
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regarding education.270 This is exactly the type of speech that the Court
wanted to protect with the speech retaliation test, and therefore courts
should rule that such speech addresses a matter of public concern.
B.

Courts Should Not Apply the Quasi-Military Rule When Analyzing
Pickering Balancing Because Supreme Court Precedent Does Not
Support It

When engaging in the second prong of Pickering balancing, courts
should refuse to apply the quasi-military rule because Supreme Court
precedent does not support its existence. The only case cited in support
of the idea that courts should conduct the balancing analysis with
increased deference to a quasi-military employer is Kelley v.
Johnson271—where the Supreme Court cited a need for esprit de corps in
ruling that a police officer’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests did
not permit him to challenge his employer’s hair grooming regulations.272
However, the Court in Kelley explicitly distinguished this case from
the First Amendment context.273 The Court found it highly significant
that the police officer brought a Fourteenth Amendment challenge,
because such claims entitle employers to far broader deference than
those challenges “based on the explicit language of the First
Amendment.”274 With this in mind, the Court applied a rational basis
review to the police officer’s claim.275
Courts are wrong to extend the Kelley holding to the First
Amendment context because the Court explicitly divorced that holding
from the First Amendment context. Thus, because all other authority for
270. See id. at 572 (“Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have
informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be
spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear
of retaliatory dismissal.”).
271. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
272. Id. at 246–49.
273. Id. at 244–45.
274. Id. (“Respondent has sought the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, not as a member
of the citizenry at large, but on the contrary as an employee of the police department . . . . We
think . . . [this distinction] is highly significant.”). At the Supreme Court level, only dissents have
suggested that an organization’s “quasi-military” nature should apply in the First Amendment
context. See Saye v. Williams, 452 U.S. 926, 929 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Rankin
v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 401 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
275. Kelley, 425 U.S. at 247; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512
U.S. 622, 641, (1994) (“Where a law is subjected to a colorable First Amendment challenge, the
rule of rationality which will sustain legislation against other constitutional challenges typically
does not have the same controlling force.”) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns,
476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986)).
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the “quasi-military” rule is derived from Kelley, courts should abandon
the quasi-military rule when analyzing the Pickering balancing prong of
the speech retaliation test.
CONCLUSION
When an employee sues his or her government employer—claiming
that the employer terminated him or her in violation of the First
Amendment right to free speech—courts conduct a three-pronged speech
retaliation test. The first prong requires the employee to prove that his or
her speech was made as a citizen and addresses a matter of public
concern. The second prong, called Pickering balancing, constitutes a
balancing of the employee’s interest in speaking against the employer’s
interest in maintaining a harmonious and effective work place. The final
prong requires courts to determine whether the employee’s protected
speech caused the termination.
Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that the employer bears the
burden of showing that it prevails under Pickering balancing. Because
employees must prove that they prevail on the increasingly narrow first
prong before reaching the balancing analysis, only that speech with the
strongest connection to speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern
reaches Pickering balancing. Combining this with Connick’s rule—that
the burden of proof on the State rises along with the strength of the
speech’s connection to matters of public concern—reveals that courts
should require the employer to prove that it prevails on Pickering
balancing under the high burden of clear and convincing evidence.
When applying the speech retaliation test to law enforcement
employees commenting on the war on drugs, courts should rule in a
manner that favors employee speech. Courts should rule that the speech
is made as a citizen because it is not directly related to the employee’s
work assignments, and that the speech addresses a matter of public
concern because the speech discusses public policy. When engaging in
Pickering balancing the Court should not apply the quasi-military
exception, because Supreme Court case law lends no support to such an
application. The Court’s adoption of these policies will help ensure that
citizens like Bryan Gonzalez, Joe Miller, and Jonathan Wender remain
free to contribute their knowledge and expertise to the marketplace of
ideas without the Government unreasonably depriving them of their
livelihoods.

